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Cryptonym: KOCH

Casual contact:
Informant :
Agent : *

A. Personal.

1. Names and aliases:
2. Nationality (present) and any previous nationalities:
Latvian
3. Passport and Identity card number:
4. Date and Place of Birth:
14:10:22 Forest of Vickak, Popen County, Latvia
5. Religion:
6. Short physical description:
Tall, thin, blond
7. Education: to include specialization in Academic field, languages,
and any special skills or accomplishments.
Studies elementary mechanical engineering
Military Academy
Speaks, reads writes, Latvian, German, Russian.

8. Marital Status and number of children:
Single

9. Past employment history: to include present legitimate employment and salary.
Wehrmacht: Latvian Division of the Brandenburg Div.
No present legal employment

10. Military record: to include any military specializations.
2nd Brandenburg Division.

11. Political background:
Latvian Nationalist, no political convictions.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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FORM
Part I - Sheet No. 2

3. Short description of work with SSU:

2 trips with OB briefs through Saxony and Thuringia

1. Recruiting Officer and place and date of recruitment:
Capt. Marchand, CIC Heidelberg Jan. 1946

2. Other Officers knowing or handling agent:
George Engel, Walter Henschel

3. Area of activity to which assigned:
Russian Zone, eventually USSR

4. Type of Intelligence:
Political (Party or Wing) some
Economic (Industrial, Agricultural, Labor)
Military *****
Religious

5. Cover used by agent in various operations and degree of success:
Discharged soldier

6. Method of contact and type of cover used in approaching agent: to include cut-outs, mail-drops and codes if used.
CIC used as cut-out, agent approached under assumed names.

7. Does agent work alone or has he a "chain":
Alone, but establishes chain in Russian Zone

8. Salary and other amenities provided: to include any positive commitments made and whether or not agent is under formal contract.
Should be legalized in Amazon and provided with physical needs. Automobile.

9. Ultimate use of agent after training and probation period:
OB in Russian Zone, and USSR.

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Cryptonym: Koch

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PSR DOI 70-17

Part II

ASSESSMENT

It is imperative that great care be taken in compiling this section. The suitability of an agent for long-term, clandestine intelligence will be based mainly on this assessment.

1. Motivation: should be the opinions of the staff members having direct contact with the agent and should indicate motivation as casual contact, informant, or agent.

Agent: wants to work for us against Russia; wants to restore free Latvia, knows he is automatic arrest here.

2. Record of past performance:

- a. Type of intelligence assigned to: Military
- b. Quality of submitted material: Good, partly very good
- c. Ability to follow up leads: to include keenness of observation, procurement of documents, etc.
Good
- d. Indicated bias, if any:
Strongly anti-Russian
- e. Objectivity of reporting:
Quite objective
- f. Ability to cover given area and specific targets:
Good
- g. Length of actual operating service:
Three months

3. Potentiality:

- a. Area of possible future assignments or operations:
Russzone - USSR
- b. Future target assignments:
OB
- c. Future use of agent: immediate or is he to be "sleepers".
Immediate

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Part II - Sheet No. 2.

4. Cover:

- a. Is present job, occupation, or profession adequate cover for long-term work:

No, but it is being worked on.

- b. What will be best method to contact agent:

Only through cut-outs.

- c. Is agent easy to work with and what type of staff personnel can be most advantageously used for contacts:

Not too difficult to handle, despite the fact that he can be described as a cold-blooded, hard-boiled agent.

5. Security:

- a. To what extent has agent been vetted:

Not known

- b. To what extent is agent informed of his connections with a clandestine intelligence organization:

Agent thinks that he is working for special branch of CIC

- c. Is he fully cognizant of the fact that he is engaged on long-term dangerous work:

Yes

- d. How much "security" is necessary in approaching agent:

Full security, no names can be mentioned

- e. Mechanics of security involved:

Approached by staff personnel under assumed names at given addresses.

6. Briefing:

- a. Does agent quickly grasp point of brief:

Yes

- b. Extent of briefing necessary:

As detailed as possible

- c. Will subject use own initiative and go beyond points of brief:

Yes

- d. Is frequent briefing necessary:

Yes

- e. Because of experience and background is agent capable of briefing sub-agents:

Yes